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Preface 
This book builds on a panel I organized and chaired at the Annual Meeting of 
the American Society of International Law in April 2014. The panel sparked 
an important conversation among participants and highlighted the impor-
tance of issues related to challenges and recusals of judges and arbitrators for 
international dispute resolution. After the panel, Marie Sheldon, Publishing 
Director of International Law at Brill/Nijhoff Publishers, suggested I collect the 
presentations made at the panel in a book. I was intrigued by the idea and-so, 
this book was born. 
I asked the panelists and other experts to join the dialogue on this key issue 
and I was gratified by the positive response I received. This book now com-
bines expertise from academia as well as from all realms of practice, from law 
firm practitioners, to former judicial clerks, arbitrators and members of several 
secretariats. I am grateful to all contributors to this book for their excellent 
work. Of course, their contributions are made on a personal note only and do 
not represent the positions of any of the institutions to which they are or may 
have been affiliated. 
My deep gratitude also goes to Sheherezade Malik, a Juris Doctor student 
from Richmond University School of Law, for her impeccable research and edi-
torial assistance. She has done a great job. 
I am also sincerely and profoundly grateful to my family, Andre, Alex and 
Charlotte, without whom nothing has meaning. 
C.G. 
Washington D.c. 
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These initial chapters provide a essential foundation for the analysis of 
challenges and recusal of judges and arbitrators. As such, they assess several 
specific issues, including the available procedures, reasons asserted to initiate 
a challenge procedure, who decides the challenges and results of the challenge 
procedures. Importantly, they also allow for a comparison among different 
forums. 
The following three chapters analyze challenges from a different prospec-
tive. Namely, they examine specific issues that are often reasons for parties 
to begin a challenges procedure. In chapter eight, Romain Zamour considers 
issue conflicts and the reasonable expectation of an open mind, specifically 
in the context of the challenge decision in Devas v. India. Judith Levine, in 
chapter nine, examines the important issues of late-in-the game challenges 
and spurious challenges and resignations within the context of tactical chal-
lenges. In chapter ten, Luke Sobota assesses repeat arbitrator appointments in 
international investment disputes, a oft-cited reason to challenge arbitrators. 
In the next three chapters, the analysis shift to personal perspectives. In 
chapter eleven, Charles Brower, Sarah Melikian and Michael Daly recount tall 
and small tales of a challenged arbitrator from a first-hand experience. Next, 
in chapter twelve, Andrew Loewenstein describes the approach and consid-
eration of counsel to challenges in international disputes. Finally, in chapter 
thirteen, Hansel Pham and Imad Khan examine challenges to party represen-
tatives and counsel before international courts and tribunals a unique mecha-
nism at times used as an alternative to challenge the decision-maker. 
The final two chapters analyze challenges from a geographical prospective 
and seek to determine whether there is a regional variation to challenges. In 
chapter fourteen, Lucy Reed, John Choong and Chan Yong Wei explain chal-
lenges to arbitrators in Asia, and especially the position before the Singapore 
and Hong Kong Courts. Finally, in chapter fifteen, Jonathan Hamilton, Francisco 
Jijon and Ernesto Corzo consider arbitrators challenges in Latin America. 
CHAPTER I 
The Challenge and Recusal of Judges of the 
International Court of Justice 
Chiara Giorgetti 
1 Introduction 
The rules and mechanisms to challenge and recuse a judge of the International 
Court of Justice ("ICJ") are unique and pertain to the control mechanisms 
proper to permanent international dispute resolution bodies, characterized by 
a plurality of representative, elected judges. 
Indeed, the Statute of the I CJ ("Statute")1 provides a series of control mech-
anisms aimed at ensuring the independence and impartiality of its judges.2 
The drafters of the Statute adopted a multi-tiered approach, relying first on 
self-control of each judge, and then envisaging a subsidiary control role for 
the President and the Court as a whole. Third-party requests for recusals are 
provided for in the Statute, but are extremely rare. The Court relies mostly on a 
self-regulation system, by which it is for a judge to recuse him or herself when 
the case so requires. The President of the Court and the Court as a whole only 
step in to provide a back-up and ensure that the framework is respected. Thus, 
should reasons exist for which a judge should be removed or not sit in a case, 
the President and the Court retain the power to take the final decision, sua 
sponte or as requested by a party, to remove the judge. 
This approach is understandable, not only because it follows the tradition 
established by the predecessor of the I CJ, the Permanent Court of International 
Justice ("PCIJ"), but also because the situation at the ICJ is intrinsically 
* I am grateful to Saud Aldawsari from Richmond University School of Law for his excellent 
research assistance for this chapter .. 
1 Statute of the International Court of Justice, concluded June 26, 1945, 3 Bevans 1179, 59 Stat. 
1031, T.s. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
2 The applicable legal framework can be found in Arts. 2, 13-20, 24 of the Statute of the Court 
and in Arts. 1-14 and 34 of the Rules of the Court and Practice Directions VII and VIII. See !CJ 
Statute; The !CJ Rules of Procedure, adopted April 14, 1978, 17 J.L.M. 1286 (1978) [hereinafter 
ICJ Rules]; Practice Direction VII, adopted Oct. 2001, !CJ, http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/ 
index.php?p1=4&p2=4&p3=0; Practice Direction VIII, adopted Oct. 2001, !CJ, http:l/www 
.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=4&p3=0. 
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different from that of arbitration: the ICJ is a permanent court, which acts as 
the principal judicial organ of the United Nations in inter-states disputes, its 
the bench is composed of fifteen elected judges who serve for relatively long 
terms.3 Thus, differently from arbitration, judges do not know what cases they 
will be called to decide and incompatibilities could arise after their election to 
the bench. 
Though self regulation has to a large extent be sufficient, the existing con-
trol system calls for examination, especially in light of the increased caseload 
of the Court and the fact that the judges of the ICJ remain active members of 
the international legal community, including as international arbitrators. 
This chapter first briefly explains how the ICJ judges are elected and nomi-
nated. It then explores the issues of relative and functional incompatibilities of 
judges. Next, it describes and assesses existing mechanisms of control, includ-
ing resignation, self-recusal and disqualification of judges. Finally, it assesses 
the three publicly known cases of recusals. The chapter concludes with a brief 
assessment of the practice. 
2 The Judges of the International Court of Justice 
The bench of the ICJ, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, com-
prises fifteen judges elected for a renewable term of nine years.4 Article 3( 1) of 
the Statute of the Court, the instrument that regulates the constitution and the 
function of the ICJ, provides that no two judges may be nationals of the same 
state.5 
Article 2 of the Statute specifies the requirements that each member of the 
Court must fulfill in order to be elected. It provides that: 
The Court shall be composed of a body of independent judges, elected 
regardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral charac-
ter, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries 
3 ICJ Statute Art.3 
4 !CJ Statute Arts. 3, 13. See generally Robert Kolb, The International Court of Justice 109-uB 
(2013); 1 Shabtai Rosanne, The Law and Practice of the International Court of Justice 1920-
2005, at 408 (2nd ed., 2006); Statute of the Court, Int'! Ct. Just.[ICJ], http://www.icj-cij.org/ 
documents/?p1=4&p2=2 (last visited Apr. 5, 2015) ("Statute of the International Court of 
Justice is annexed to the United Nations, of which it forms an integral part."). 
5 !CJ Statute Art. 3(1). 
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for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of rec-
ognized competence in international law.6 
The Statute further specifies that members of the Court elected by the General 
Assembly and by the Security Council of the United Nations should come from 
a list of persons nominated by the national groups in the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration ("PCA") or in cases of Members of the United Nations not repre-
sented in the PCA, by national groups appointed for this purpose by their gov-
ernments under the same conditions as those prescribed for PCA members.7 
It is recommended that in making their nominations, national groups con-
sult their highest court of justice, legal faculties and schools of law, and their 
national academies and national sections of international academies devoted 
to the study of law. Groups may not nominate more than four persons, not 
more than two of whom shall be of their own nationality. 8 The number of can-
didates nominated by a group should not be more than double the number of 
seats to be filled.9 
In electing members, the General Assembly and the Security Council pro-
ceed independently of one another. Candidates are then elected when they 
obtain an absolute majority of votes in both the General Assembly and in the 
Security Council.10 During the election, electors are required to bear in mind 
two considerations, and namely "not only that the persons to be elected should 
individually possess the qualifications required, but also that in the body as a 
6 !CJ Statute Art. 2. See generally Aznar-Gomez, Article 2, in The Statute of the International 
Court ofJustice, A Commentary (Andreas Zimmermann, Karin Oellers-Frahm & Christian 
Tomuschat eds., 2nd ed., 2012). 
7 !CJ Statute Art. 4. 
8 Id.Art. 6. 
9 Id.Art.5. 
10 Id. Arts. 8, 10. Article 10 provides that candidates who obtain an absolute majority of votes 
in both the General Assembly and the Council are elected. If no candidate receives an 
absolute majority on the first ballot in either the General Assembly or the Council, a sec-
ond ballot is held. Balloting continues until a candidate has obtained the required major-
ity in both bodies. Articles 11 and 12 of the Statute provide that if the General Assembly 
and the Council do not select the same candidate, they will proceed to a second meeting 
and, if necessary, a third meeting, following the same procedures. If by then the position 
is not filled, the Council and General Assembly may decide to convene a conference of 
six members (three from each body) to recommend a candidate for acceptance by both 
bodies. Id. Arts. 11-12. 
/ 
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whole the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal 
legal systems of the world should be assured:'11 
2 .1 The Duties of Elected judges 
Judges at the ICJ serve in their personal capacity and not on behalf of any 
government. Judges of the nationality of each of the parties in a case retain 
their rights to sit in the case before the Court, unless a specific incompatibility 
exist.12 
All judges are required, upon taking up their duties, to make a solemn decla-
ration in open court that they "will perform [their] duties and exercise [their] 
powers as judge honourably, faithfully, impartially and conscientiouslY:'13 This 
declaration is along the lines of the declarations that judges make in other 
international courts.14 
11 ICJ Statute Art. g. In practice, this requirement is satisfied with the convention of equi-
table geographical distribution. The practice is to have one judge each from each of the 
permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, Russia, UK and the us) and 
the remaining ten seats distributed as following: five for Western Europe and Other States, 
three for Africa, three for Asia, two for Easter Europe and two for Latin America and 
Caribbean countries. See Ruth MacKenzie et al., Selecting International]udges: Principle, 
Process and Politics 28 ( 2010 ). 
12 ICJ Statute Art. 31(1). 
13 Article 4 of the Rules of the Court specifies the text of the declaration to be read in court. 
Judges are required to state that: "I solemnly declare that I will perform my duties and 
exercise my powers as judge honourably, faithfully, impartially and conscientiously." ICJ 
Rules Art. 4. This declaration is to be made at the first public sitting at which the Member 
of the Court is present. 
14 For example, judges at the International Criminal Court (rec) take a public oath declaring: 
"I solemnly undertake that I will perform my duties and exercise my powers as a judge of 
the International Criminal Court honourably, faithfully, impartially and conscientiously, 
and that I will respect the confidentiality of investigations and prosecutions and the 
secrecy of deliberations". rec Rules of Procedure and Evidence, adopted Sept. g, 2002, rec 
Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part. rr-A); see Press Release, Int'! Criminal Court, Six Newly Elected 
rec Judges to be Sworn in on 10 March 2015 (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_ 
menus/icc/press%2oand%2omedia/press%2oreleases/Pages/ma178.aspx. At I CS ID, arbi-
trators make a declaration that states, in the relevant part, that:" 'I shall keep confidential 
all information coming to my knowledge as a result of my participation in this proceed-
ing, as well as the contents of any award made by the Tribunal. 'I shall judge fairly as 
between the parties, according to the applicable law, and shall not accept any instruction 
or compensation with regard to the proceeding from any source except as provided in the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States and in the Regulations and Rules made pursuant thereto." rcsm Arbitration 
Rules of Procedure r. 6, adopted Apr. 2006, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID /StaticFiles/ 
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Members of the Court need to hold themselves permanently at the disposal 
of the Court, unless they are on leave or are prevented from doing so by illness 
or by another serious reason duly explained to the President.15 Judges become 
international civil servants and are entitled to diplomatic privileges and immu-
nities when engaged on the business of the Court.16 Judges are remunerated as 
decided by the UN General Assembly. 
Additionally, as explained below, the Statute provides for certain relative 
and absolute incompatibilities with the function of judge. 
2.2 Relative Incompatibility to Serve as judge in the Court 
Under the Statute of the Court, judges must refrain from sitting in certain 
cases. Thus, Article 17(1) of the Statute provides that no member may act as 
agent, counsel, or advocate in any case.17 Further, Article 17(2) also dictates 
that members may not participate in the decision of any case in which they 
have previously taken part "as agent, counsel, or advocate for one of the par-
ties, or as a member of a national or international court, or of a commission of 
enquiry, or in any other capacity."18 
Relative incompatibility relates to the impartiality and independence of a 
judge in particularly cases, and is temporary.19 Thus, a judge who acted as legal 
advisor to her government in a particular case before her election to the Bench, 
or was consulted and acted as an advocate when he was in academia before 
joining the Court is barred from serving as judges in the case on which they 
have worked. As a matter of legal policy, this is a fundamental guarantee for a 
fair process. Similar incompatibility guidelines are found in most provisions 
related to judicial independence.20 Indeed, the provision should be interpreted 
basicdoc/partF-chapo1.htm; see also Chapter 2 by Meg Kinnear and Chapter 7 by Makane 
Mbengue in this volume. 
is lCJ Statute Art. 23. 
i6 lCJ Statute Art. ig. See generally Gleider I. Hernandez, Impartiality and Bias at the 
International Court of justice, 3 Cambridge]. Int'! & Com.1.183 (2012). 
i 7 ICJ Statute Art.17. 
i8 Id. 
ig See JD Morely, Relative Incompatibility of Function in the International Court, 19 
Int'! & Comp. L.Q. 316 (1970 ); Philippe Couvrer, Article 17, in The Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, A Commentary (Andreas Zimmermann et al. eds., 2nd 
ed., 2012); see also Shabti Rosenne, International Court of justice: Practice Directions 
on judges Ad Hoc; Agents, Counsel and Advocates; and Submission of New Documents, 
i L. & Prac. Int'! Cts. & Tribunals 223 (2002). 
20 See, e.g., Chapter 7 by Makene Mbengue in this volume (discussing challenges of judges in 
International Criminal Courts). 
/ 
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quite openly so as to include all situations that could create a reasonable doubt 
of lack of impartiality and of pre-judgment of a certain case.21 
The Court, however, has historically accepted situations that would be seen 
as problematic in the present context of international litigation.22 For exam-
ple, Judge Helge Klaestad (Norway) continued to sit in the 1951 Norwegian 
Fisheries case (Norway v. UK) even though he had been a member of the 
Supreme Court of Norway that had given a decision invoked in the ICJ pro-
ceedings and relevant to them.23 Similarly, Judges Jules Basdevant (France) 
and Green Hackworth (us) sat in the 1952 Case Concerning the Rights of 
Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France v. us), though 
they had been legal advisers to their respective ministers of foreign affairs at 
the time the case was under diplomatic discussion.24 This tollerant interpreta-
tion of relative incompatibility appear to more prevalent in the initial days of 
the court, and followed closely the liberal practice adopted in this matter by 
the Permanent Court oflnternationalJustice.25 Nowadays, ICJ judges are more 
likely to adopt a stricter interpretation of the incompatibility provision, and 
have in numerous occasions recused themselves in certain cases.26 Indeed, 
of the thirty-six known cases of self-recusals, twenty-one occurred after the 
21 See, e.g., Chapter 8 by Romain Zamour in this volume (discussing prejudgment and open-
minded requirements). 
22 Kolb, supra note 4, at 136; see Couvreur, Article 17, supra note 17, at 379-81 (providing an 
overview of the practice of the PCIJ ). 
23 Kolb, supra note 4, at 136; see Fisheries (u.K. v. Nor.),Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. u6, 134 (Dec.18) 
(referencing a Supreme Court case in which the Court relied to interpret the Decree that 
delimitated the exclusive fishery zone at issue in the ICJ case). 
24 Kolb, supra note 4, at 136. Green Haywood Hackworth served as the first u.s. judge on 
the International Court of Justice and was the longest running Legal Adviser to the us 
Department of State, serving from 1925 to his elevation to the bench in 1946. See Rights of 
Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v. u.s.),Judgment, 1952 1.c.J. 
176 (Aug. 27). 
25 See Kolb, supra note 4, at 136 (''.As regards Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Statute, the PCIJ'S 
attitude was highly restrictive: normally it preferred to allow the judges in question 
to sit."). 
26 Couvreur, Article 17, supra note 17, at 382 ("Whenever a member of the Court, has, before 
taking office, acted as agent, counsel or advocate of one of the parties to a case, has had 
always disqualified himself from the case without this ever becoming an issue. The same 
has applied to any judge taking part in arbitration proceeding which have become the 
subject of proceedings before the Court."); see, e.g., Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn.& Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 
Verbatim Record, 6 (Apr. 29, 1996, 10 a.m.), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/5105 
.pdf (showing the self-recusals of Judge Higgins and Judge Fleischhauer by informing the 
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year 2000.27 Thus, for example, Judge Rosalyn Higgins (uK) chose not to sit 
in the Application of the Genocide Convention case because she had been a 
member of the UN Committee of Human Rights and as such had previously 
dealt with certain matters likely to be material in the case.28 Similarly, Judge 
Mohammed Bedjaoui (Algeria) recused himself from the bench in Arbitral 
Award of 31 July 1989 case because he had been a member of the Arbitral tri-
bunal in question.29 Likewise, Judge Christopher Weeramantry (Sri Lanka) 
decided not to sit in the Phosphate Lands in Nauru case because he had previ-
ously acted as the Chair of a Commission of Enquiry that reported on the mat-
ters and could be pertinent in the case.3° 
This stricter approach to the relative incompatibility provision is preferable, 
and is better suited to the role and work of the Court. Indeed, in light of the 
increased workload of the Court, the important past professional experiences 
of each judge and the delicate balance ensuing from the right for judges of the 
nationality of the parties to sit in the case before the court,31 the issue of rela-
tive incompatibility continues to be crucial. Moreover, while judges are barred 
from acting as counsel, advocate, or as members of a national or international 
court, they are routinely appointed as arbitrators in ad hoc investment and 
other international arbitrations which increases the possibility of the exis-
tence of relative incompatibility. A more detailed account of self-recusals in 
situations of relative incompatibility follows below, in section 3.3. 
2.3 Absolute (Functional) Incompatibility to Serve as judge in the Court 
Article i6 of the Statute provides that members of the Court "may not exercise 
any political or administrative functions, or engage in any other occupation of 
a professional nature."32 Given the membership of the bench, which includes 
academics and high ranking international and national civil servants, this 
President that they have dealt in their previous capacities with certain matters likely to 
be material to that case). 
27 See infra, table 1. 
28 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Verbatim Record, supra note 25, at 6; see also Rosanne, supra note 4, at 1064. 
29 I.C.J. Yearbooki989-1990, at 157 (1990 ); see also Rosanne, supra note 4, at 1064. 
30 I.C.J. Yearbooki991-1992, at 198 (1992); see also Rosanne, supra note 4, at 1064. 
31 ICJ Statute Art. 31(1). 
32 ICJ Statute Art. 16. See generally G. Guillaume, De L'independence des Membres de la Cour 
International de justice, in Boutros-Boutros-Ghali Arnicorum Discipulorumque Liber 475 
(1998); L.V. Prott, The Role of the judge in the International Court of justice, 10 Revue Beige 
de Droit International [RBDI] 473 (1974); G. Scwarzernberger, The Problem of Functional 
Incompatibilities Before International Courts, 27 Y. B. World Aff. 434 (1973). 
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functional incompatibility is at the core of the judicial function. Thus, once 
elected, Members of the Court routinely resign from all previous professional 
positions, including academic professorships and legal advisor or civil service 
positions, including with the United Nations.33 
Because of its importance to guarantee a fair and independent process, all 
issues related to functional incompatibility and of the kind of activities that 
are allowed and prohibited by the Statute have retained the attention of the 
Court since its establishment, and have been analyzed by the Court in details. 
The Court established a three-member committee on the incompatibility of 
functions twice, in 1947 and 1967. The Committees' full reports are not pub-
lished, though the ICJ Yearbooks confirmed similar guidelines to judges in four 
broad categories of possible professional activities, and namely: other forms of 
peaceful settlement of dispute (such as arbitration), scientific activities, pub-
lic functions and occupation of a professional nature, and private activities. 
Judges retain a degree of discretion and in the event of a doubt should con-
sult the President of the Court for guidance on acceptable and unacceptable 
activities.34 A 1994 Report of the ICJ Advisory Committee on Administrative 
and Budgetary Questions delved deeper into functional incompatibility and 
concluded that, under Article i6, judges are prohibited from exercising any 
political or administrative function, irrespective to whether it is international, 
national or local ad commercial or not.35 Judges are also barred from holding 
positions in any commercial concerns, engaging in the practice of law, 
33 For example, Judge James Crawford was Whewell Professor of International Law at 
Cambridge before joining the Court. Judge Bruno Simma was also Professor at the 
European University Institute. Judges Ronny Abrahams and Joan Donahue were civil 
servants, respectively with the French and us governments. Judge Abdulqawi Yusuf 
servered for a long time with the United Nations. They all resigned from these posts 
upon taking office. See Judge James Richard Crawford, ICJ, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/ 
index.php?p1=1&p2=2&p3=1&judge=200 (last visited Apr. 4, 2015);Judge Bruno Simma, 
ICJ, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/?p1=1&p2=2&p3=1&judge=14 (last visited Apr. 4, 2015); 
President Ronny Abraham, ICJ, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/?p1=1&p2=2&p3=1&judge=136 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2015); Judge Joan E. Donoghue, ICJ, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/'? 
p1=1&p2=2&p3=1&judge=171 (last visited Apr. 4, 2015); Vice-President Abdulqawi Ahmed 
Yusuf, ICJ, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=2&p3=1&judge=168 (last 
visited Apr. 4, 2015). 
34 Philippe Couvreur, Article 16, in The Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
A Commentary 365-366 (Andreas Zimmermann et al. eds., 2nd ed., 2012 ). 
35 U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 7, Add.11, U.N. Doc. A/49/7/Add.11 (Mar. 8, 1995); see also 
Couvreur, Article 16, supra note 32, at 368. 
1--
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maintaining membership in a law firm or rendering legal or expert opinions or 
holding any permanent teaching or administrative position.36 
Interestingly, the 1994 Report also highlighted accepted practice, including 
the fact that judges could continue to "participate in other judicial or quasi-
judicial activities of an occasional nature as well as scholarly pursuits in the 
sphere of international law as members oflearned societies or as occasional lec-
tures, provided that they give the fullest precedent to the duties of the court."37 
The Court explicitly and definitively took up the question in its annual report 
to the General Assembly, where it confirmed that "the practice of the Court in 
permitting its members to engage in occasional activities outside of the Court 
that may be remunerated" included "acting as arbitrators in inter-State and 
private international arbitrations, serving in administrative tribunals or quasi-
judicial organs of specialized agencies, lecturing, [and] writing."38 The Court 
observed that this kind of occasional practice went back to "the origins of the 
Permanent Court of Internationaljustice" and observed that not only it was 
in conformity with the Statute of the Court; the repeated endorsement 
by the international organs and by the States that appointed members of 
the Court as arbitrators shows their awareness of the contribution that 
the members of the Court may, by this function, make to the develop-
ment of international law, and of the benefits deriving therefrom for all 
institutions concerned.39 
The Court remarked that the practices involved a very limited number of judges 
for a very limited amount of time and that no adverse effect of the work of the 
court. In practice, several judges have served as arbitrators in ad hoc arbitra-
tions, including in the Eritrea/Yemen-Question of Territorial Sovereignty and 
Maritime Delimitation over a Group of Islands in the Red Sea (Awards of 1998 
36 Couvreur, Article 16, supra note 32, at 367. 
37 Id. 
38 Annual Report to the General Assembly for the Period 1August1995 to 31July 1996, U.N. 
GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 4, at 199, u.N. Doc. A/50/7/Add.u (Dec. 12, 1995); see also 
Couvreur, Article. 16, supra note 32, at 368. 
39 Annual Report to the General Assembly, supra note 39; see also Couvreur, Article 16, supra 
note 32, at 368. 
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and December i7, iggg),40 the Abyei Arbitration,41 and the Croatia/Slovenia 
boundary disputes.42 Moreover, a growing number of judges also act as arbi-
trators in international investment proceedings.43 
Additionally, the President of the Court is also occasionally asked to serve as 
the appointing authority in ad hoc arbitrations.44 Similarly, occasional invita-
tions to deliver a speech or a class in a course or to address the public on the 
40 Former Judges Stephen Schwebel and Rosalyn Higgins were members of the arbitral tribu-
nal in both phases of the Eritrea/Yemen dispute. See Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the 
First Stage of the Proceedings (Erti./Yemen ), Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute 
(Oct. 9, 1998), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=458; AwarJ of the Arbitral 
Tribunal in the Second Stage of the Proceedings (ErtL/Yemen), Maritime Delimitation 
(Dec. 17, 1999), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=459. 
41 Former Judges Shawkat Al-Khasawneh and Stephen Schwebel were members of the 
arbitration tribunal. See The Government of Sudan / The Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement/Army (Abyei Arbitration), Final Award (July 22, 2009), http://www.pca-cpa 
.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=1240. 
42 Former Judges Gilbert Guillaume and Bruno Simma are members of the arbitral tribu-
nal for the currently pending Croatia/Slovenia arbitration. See Arbitration Between the 
Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia, Pending Case, http://www.pca-cpa.org/ 
showpage.asp?pag_id=1443 (last visited Apr. 4, 2015). 
43 For example, current member, Judge Peter Tomka is a member of an investor-state 
arbitration tribunal related to a bilateral agreement between Germany and the Czech 
Republic. See Antaris Solar GmbH (Germany) & Dr. Michael Gode (Gennany) v. The Czech 
Republic, Pending Case, http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1548 (last vis-
ited Apr. 19, 2015). Former member, Judge Bernardo Sepwveda-Amor, is the presiding 
arbitrator in three investor-state proceedings related to bilateral agreements between 
the governments of Cypress and Russia and the government of India. See (1) Tenoch 
Holdings Limited (Cyprus) (2) Mr. Maxim Naumchenko (Russian Federation) (3) Mr. Andrey 
Poluektov (Russian Federation) v. The Republic of India, Pending Cases, http://www 
.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1552 (last visited Apr.19, 2015). Former Judge Stephen 
Schwebel was a member of three investor-state arbitral tribunals between private compa-
nies and the Russia. See Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, Final 
Award (July 18, 2014), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=2722; Yukos Universal 
Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, Final Award (July 18, 2014), http://www. 
pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=2723; Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian 
Federation, Final Award (Julyi8, 2014), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=2724. 
44 See, e.g., cc/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd., Devas Employees Mauritius Private Limited, and Te/com 
Devas Mauritius Limited v. Republic of India, Decision on the Respondent's Challenge 
to the Hon. Marc Lalonde as Presiding Arbitrator and Prof. Francisco Orrego Vicuna as 
Co-Arbitrator, 1 (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-doc-
uments/italaw316i.pdf.pdf ("By the Appointing Authority: H.E. Judge Peter Tomka[,] 
President, International Court of]ustice(. ]"). 
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activities of the Court are routinely accepted by judges and do not create any 
incompatibility.45 
24 Ad Hoc Judges 
In addition to the elected Members of the Court, the Statute provides that if 
the Court does not include in the Bench a judge of the nationality of one of the 
parties, the other party may chose a person to sit as ajudge.46 
The presence of national and ad hoc judges originated in the PCIJ Statute 
and is not uncommon in international judicial proceedings by standing 
courts.47 That said, ad hoc judges in international litigation are somehow an 
anomaly, as all judges are deemed to be independent and impartial and should 
by themselves be able to provide comfort to all parties that their case will be 
decided fairly. Further, elected judges are also elected partially because of 
their nationality, but are then required to forgo that link once elected. Once 
the Bench is constituted, it is peculiar that nationality should play a role again 
when specific cases enter the docket. 
Judges ad hoc are required to make the solemn declaration required from 
elected members under Article 20. They take part in the decision on terms of 
complete equality with their colleagues. 48 
Several of the provisions applicable to elected members are also applicable 
to ad hoc judges. In particular, all conditions of independence, of high moral 
45 Kolb, supra note 4, at 133-34; Couvrer, Article. 16, supra note 32, at 366. 
46 !CJ Statute Art. 31 ("1.Judges of the nationality of each of the parties shall retain their right 
to sit in the case before the Court. 2. If the Court includes upon the Bench a judge of the 
nationality of one of the parties, any other party may choose a person to sit as judge. Such 
person shall be chosen preferably from among those persons who have been nominated 
as candidates as provided in Articles 4 and 5. 3. If the Court includes upon the Bench 
no judge of the nationality of the parties, each of these parties may proceed to choose a 
judge as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article .... 5. Should there be several parties in the 
same interest, they shall, for the purpose of the preceding provisions, be reckoned as one 
party only. Any doubt upon this point shall be settled by the decision of the Court ... ."). 
47 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
Art. 26, concluded Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.s. 221 ("(1)To consider cases brought before it, the 
Court shall sit in a single-judge formation, in committees of three judges, in Chambers of 
seven judges and in a Grand Chamber of seventeen judges. The Court's Chambers shall 
set up committees for a fixed period of time .... (4) There shall sit as an exofficio mem-
ber of the Chamber and the Grand Chamber the judge elected in respect of the High 
Contracting Party concerned. If there is none or if that judge is unable to sit, a person 
chosen by the President of the Court from a list submitted in advance by that Party shall 
sit in the capacity of judge."). 
48 See I CJ Statute Arts. 20, 31( 6). 
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character and of being either a jurisconsults of recognized competence in 
international law or possessing the qualification required in their respective 
countries for appointments to the highest judicial offices must also be ful-
filled by ad hoc judges.49 Additionally, Article i7(2), prohibiting members to 
participate in any case in which they have previously participated as agent, 
counsel or advocate for one the parties or as a member of a national or inter-
national court, or of a commission of enquiry, or in any other capacity is also 
applicable.so 
To reconcile the freedom of the parties to select ad hoc judges of their 
choosing with the requirement that all judges act independently, the Court 
addressed possible instances of functional incompatibility of judge in its two 
recent practice directions.SI Specifically, Practice Direction VII provides that: 
The Court considers that it is not in the interest of the sound admin-
istration of justice that a person sit as judge ad hoc in one case who is 
also acting or has recently acted as agent, counsel or advocate in another 
case before the Court. Accordingly, parties, when choosing a judge ad 
hoc pursuant to Article 31 of the Statute and Article 35 of the Rules of 
Court, should refrain from nominating persons who are acting as agent, 
counsel or advocate in another case before the Court or have acted in 
that capacity in the three years preceding the date of the nomination. 
Furthermore, parties should likewise refrain from designating as agent, 
counsel or advocate in a case before the Court a person who sits as judge 
ad hoc in another case before the Court.s2 
Additionally, Practice Direction VIII provides that: 
The Court considers that it is not in the interest of the sound adminis-
tration of justice that a person who until recently was a Member of the 
Court, judge ad hoc, Registrar, Deputy Registrar or higher official of the 
49 ICJ Rules Art.1; ICJ Statute Art. 2. 
50 ICJ Statute Art. 31(6) ('Judges chosen as laid down in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of this Article 
shall fulfill the conditions required by Articles 2, 17 (paragraph 2), 20, and 24 of the pres-
ent Statute. They shall take part in the decision on terms of complete equality with their 
colleagues."). 
51 Loretta Malintoppi, Independence, Impartiality, and Duty of Discloser of Arbitrators, in 
International Investment Law 796, 813-14 (Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino & Christoph 
Schreuer eds., 2008). 
52 Practice Direction VII, supra note 3. 
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Court (principal legal secretary, first secretary or secretary), appear as 
agent, counsel or advocate in a case before the Court. Accordingly, par-
ties should refrain from designating as agent, counsel or advocate in a 
case before the Court a person who in the three years preceding the date 
of the designation was a Member of the Court, judge ad hoc, Registrar, 
Deputy Registrar or higher official of the Court.53 
These directions are applicable for any choice or designation taking place after 
February 7, 2002, and they are meant to exclude any possible instance of func-
tional incompatibility arising from prior or current service at the ICJ.54 
3 Mechanisms of Control: Resignation, Self-Recusal and 
Disqualification of Judges 
In an effort to maintain the independence and impartiality of its judges and 
the stature proper of the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and its 
role as the primus inter pares of the standing courts, the ICJ Statute adopts a 
tiered procedure to challenges and recusals of judges of the court. 
Thus, as explained in details below, it is at first incumbent upon each judge 
to recuse him or herself if some reason exists to do so. When this does not hap-
pen and the reasons that preclude them to serve continue to exist, it is the role 
of the President of the Court, possibly informed by one of the parties, and of 
the entire Court to ensure that no functional or relative incompatibility exists 
in the course of proceedings. 
3.1 Resignation from the Bench 
Once elected, the judges of the ICJ are irremovable and serve for renewable 
terms of nine years.55 As detailed in the next section, only a unanimous vote 
of the other members of the Court can relieve a judge of his or her function in 
situation where he or she has ceased to fulfill the required conditions to serve. 
It is relatively more common for judges to resign from the Bench before the 
end of their terms if a reason exists that precludes them to exercise their func-
tions. Article 13 of the 1 CJ Statute does not require that judges provide reasons 
53 Practice Direction VIII, supra note 3. 
54 For the limits of the practice directions see Chapter 13 by Hansel Pham and M. Imad Khan 
in this volume. 
55 !CJ Statute Art.13. 
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for their resignations, which are to be addressed to the President of the Court 
for transmission to the Secretary-General. 
In general, however, such resignations occur either for serious health issues 
or because of the existence of a new superseding long-term incompatibil-
ity. Thus, for example, Judge Awn Shawkat Al-Khasawneh resigned from the 
Bench on December 311 20111 after being appointed Prime Minister of Jordan.56 
Similarly, Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui resigned on September 301 2001, when he 
was appointed President of the Constitutional Council of Algeria.57 Vacancies 
created by resignation are filled in the same method used to fill in the first 
election.58 Health related resignations are rarer, and judges may either wish 
to serve for the entire remainder of their term and then simply not seek re-
election, or may just prefer not to disclose the reasons for their resignation. 
The newly elected judge serves for the remaining of the term of the judge he 
or she replaces.59 
It has also become customary for judges of certain veto-holding powers that 
always have a judge of their nationality of the Bench to resign before the end 
of their terms, possibly to allow an easier election for their successors, who will 
run in a special election, and will then also have the time to prove themselves 
as judges before running in general elections.60 
56 See Press Release No. 2012/1, Int'! Court of Justice, The Secmity Council Has Fixed the 
Date for the Election of a Successor to Mr. Awn Shawkat Al-Khasawneh, Former judge 
and Vice-President of the International Court of Justice (Jan. 20, 2012 ), available at http:// 
www.icj-cij.org/presscom/files/1/16861.pdf. 
57 See Press Release No. 2001/20, Int'! Court of Justice, Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui, Former 
President of the Court, Will resign as a Member of the Court as of 30 September 2001 (July 
6, 2001), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/index.php?pr=115&pt=1&p1=6&p2 
=1&PHPSESSID=5c407. Kolb points out that other Judges that resigned from the Court 
or its predecessor the PCIJ include: Moore (1928), Hughes (1930), Kellog (1935), Wang 
(1936), Urrutia (1942), Nagaoka (1942), Golunski (1953), Morozov (1985), Jennings (1995), 
(Schwebel) and Guillaume (2005). Kolb, supra note 4, at 133· 
58 !CJ Statute Art.14. 
59 !CJ Statute Art.15. 
60 See for example the resignations of the two most recent us judges: Stephen Schwebel, who 
was elected in 1981 and resigned in 2000, and Thomas Buergenthal, who was elected in 
March 2000 and resigned in September 2010. See judge Buergenthal Resigns; u.s. National 
Group Nominates Joan Donoghue for Election to International Court of justice, 104 Am.J. Int'! 
L. 489 (2010); Peter Kooijmans, Tivo Remarkable Men Have Left the International Court 
of justice, Leiden J. Int'! L. 343 (2000) (discussing the resignation of President Stephen 
Schwebel and Judge Christopher G. Weeramantry in 2000 ). 
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3.2 Removal of judges from the Bench by the Court 
Article 18 of the Statute provides that judges can be removed by a unanimous 
vote of the other members of the Court in situation where he or she has ceased 
to fulfill the required conditions to serve.61 
In such eventuality, Article 6 of the Rules of the Court provides that the 
President, or, if the circumstances so require, the Vice-President, informs 
the relevant member of the Court with a written statement that includes the 
grounds for the proposed removal and any relevant evidence.62 At a private 
meeting of the Court specially convened for the purpose, the member of the 
Court is then afforded an opportunity of making a statement, of furnishing 
any information or explanations he wishes, and of supplying answers, orally or 
in writing, to any questions put to him. The matter will then be discussed in a 
private meeting, without the presence of the member of the Court concerned, 
at which each member of the Court shall state his or her opinion. A vote is 
taken if requested. 63 
Formal notification of the decision of removal that creates the vacancy is to 
be made to the UN Secretary General by the ICJ Registrar.64 
The threshold for this procedure is high and would require some serious 
failings, in terms of either work-related or personal conflict or serious health 
issues that incapacitate the judge to exercise her functions.65 Indeed, as it is 
to be expected, in the history of the Court, there is "no recorded instances of 
Article 18 being applied in order to dismiss a judge" or even of the question of 
formal dismissal of a judge ever been formally entertained by the Court. 66 
3.3 Voluntary (or Self) Recusals for a Specific Case 
Voluntary (or self) recusals are by far the most common method to control the 
composition of the ICJ bench and ensure its independence and impartiality. 
61 ICJ Statute Art. 18 ("No member of the Court can be dismissed unless, in the unanimous 
opinion of the other members, he has ceased to fulfill the required conditions. 2. Formal 
notification thereof shall be made to the Secretary-General by the Registrar. 3. This notifi-
cation makes the place vacant."). 
62 ICJ Rules Art.6. 
63 Id. 
64 ICJ Statute Art.18. 
65 See Kolb, supra note 4, at 132 n. 76. 
66 David Anderson & Samuel Wordsworth, Article 18, in The Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, A Commentary 392 (Andreas Zimmerman et al. eds., 2nd ed., 2006); see 
also Kolb, supra note 4, at 132-33. 
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Article 24 ( 1) provides that if a member of the Court considers that "for some 
special reasons" he should not take part in the decision of a particular case, he 
should inform the President. The language of the provision is very general so 
as to allow its application in a variety of circumstances and to ensure that any 
possible appearance of bias is voluntary addressed by the judge. 
This form of relative incompatibility relates to the impartiality of a judge 
for a particular case, and relates to the advisability for a judge to be part of 
the bench for a particular case only, which does no result in the necessity 
for the judge to resign and permanently leave the ICJ. In the history of the 
Court, a number of judges have recused themselves for a variety of reasons. 
For example, a judge who was involved as a legal adviser to a government 
which is now party to a case could be reasonably seen as biased, despite the 
judge's best effort. Similarly, there may be personal relationship at issue that 
could create the appearance of a bias. Thus, Judge Benegal Rau recused him-
self in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case because he was the Indian representa-
tive in the Security Council when the dispute was discussed.67 Similarly, Judge 
Hersch Lauterpacht recused himself in the Nottebohm case noting that he had 
been consulted by one of the parties before joining the Court.68 In another 
case, Judge Jules Basdevant recused himself in the advisory opinion on the 
judgments of the UNAT because the President of the Tribunal whose judgments 
were to be reviewed by the Court was her daughter, Suzanne Bastid.69 
Table 1.1 summarizes the instances of self-recusals at the ICJ and the reasons 
asserted by the judges in those situations. 
TABLE LI Summary of judges' self-recusal at the IC] and reasons assertecfl0 
Judge 
Sir Benegal Rau 
Case 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (United 
Kingdom v. Iran) Uu!:y 22, 
1952) 
Reason 
Having regard to the fact the 
he had represented India in 
the Security Council in 
67 I.C.J. Yearbook 1951-1952, at 89-90 (1952); see also Rosanne, supra note 4, at 1063. 
68 I.C.J. Yearbooki954-55, at 88 (1955); see also Rosanne, supra note 4, at 1064. Note also that 
his son, Elihu Lauterpacht acted as counsel to Liechtenstein in the preliminary objection 
phase. 
69 Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Oral 
Statements, 281 (June 10, 1954, 10:30 a.m. ); see also Rosanne, supra note 4, at 1063. 
70 Note that this table also include cases in which no reason was given for a judge's absence 
in the decision. 
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Judge 
Judge Basdevant 
Judge Sir Hersch 
Lauterpacht 
Judge Jessup 
Judge Zafrulla Khan 
Juges Petren and 
Ignacio-Pinto 
Case 
UNAT advisor opinion 
(July 13, 1954) 
Second phase of Notterbohm 
case (Liechtenstein v. 
Guatemala) (Apr. 6, 1955) 
Either phase of Temple of 
Preah Vihear case (Cambodia 
v. Thailand) (May 26, 1961 & 
June 15, 1962) 
Barcelona Traction (Belgium v. 
Spain) (July 24, 1964 & Feb. 5, 
1970) 
Review of UNAT judgment 
No. 158 Advisory Opinion 
(July 12, 1973) 
71 Rosanne, supra note 4, at 1064. 
72 Id. 
19 
Reason 
1951 whenithaddealtwith 
the UK complaint against 
Iran for failure to comply 
with the interim measures 
indicated by the Court 
He was closely related to the 
President of the Tribunal 
Having previously advised 
one of the parties and felt 
that Article 1 7 applied 
No reason given in 
Judgement. 71 
No reason given in 
Judgement. 72 
Informed President 
(Zufmlla Khan) that having 
contributed as members of 
the Administrative Tribunal 
to the establishment of 
the jurisprudence of the 
Tribunal referred to in the 
case, they considered that 
they should not take part 
in the proceedings. The 
action was taken under 
Article 24 of the Statute and 
the President agreed with 
them.73 
73 Application for Review of judgment No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 
Reading of the Advisory Opinion, 179 (July 12, 1973), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ 
files/57/g435.pdf; Rosanne, supra note 4, at 1064. 
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TABLE 1.1 Summary of judges' self-recusal (cont.) 
Judge 
Sir RobertJennings 
andJudge Evensen 
Judge Bedjaoui 
Judge Weeramantry 
Judge Fleischhauer 
Judge Higgins 
Case 
Application for Revision and 
Interpretation of the Judgment 
of 24 February 1982 in the Case 
concerning the Continental 
Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya) (Dec. 10, 1985) 
ArbitralAward of 31 July 1989 
(Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal) 
(Nov. 121 1991) 
Phosphate Lands in Nauru 
(Nauru v. Australia) (June 26, 
1992) 
Application of the Convention 
on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and 
Montenegro) (July 11, 1996) 
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Reason 
They gave prior notice to 
the President (Nagendra 
Singh) that they would not 
take part in the case.74 
Since he had been a 
member of the Arbitral 
Tribunal in question.75 
Having previously been 
Chairman of a commission 
of Enquiry which had 
reported on matters which 
might be pertinent in the 
case.76 
Judge Fleischhauer and 
Judge Higgins informed 
the President that having 
previously dealt in their 
previous capacities with 
certain matters likely to be 
material to the case, they 
felt that they could not take 
part in the case, pursuant to 
the applicable provisions of 
the Statute.77 
74 I.C.J. Yearbooki984-1985, at 177 (1990 ); see also Rosanne, supra note 4, at 1064. 
75 I.C.J. Yearbook 1989-1990, at 157 (1990 ); see also Rosanne, supra note 4, at 1064. 
76 I.C.J. Yearbook 1991-1992, at 198 (1992); see also Rosanne, supra note 4, at 1064. 
77 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosn.& Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Verbatim Record, 6 (Apr. 29, 1996), 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/5105.pdf; see also Rosanne, supra note 4, at 1065 
n.22. 
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Judge 
Judge Tomka 
Judge Simma 
JudgeSimma 
Judge Abraham 
Judge Abraham 
Case 
Gabclkovo-Nagymaros Project 
(Hungary/Slovakia) (Sept. 25, 
1997) 
All of Legality of Use of Force 
(Preliminary Objections) cases 
(June 2, 1999) 
Certain Property (Liechtenstein 
v. Germany) (Feb. 10, 2005) 
Certain Criminal Proceedings 
in France (Republic of the 
Congo v. France) (June 1 7, 
2003) 
Certain Questions of Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters 
(Djiboutiv. France) (June 4, 
2008) 
21 
Reason 
''.Judge Tomka ... recused 
himself under Article 24 of 
the Statute of the Court."78 
Considered that pursuant to 
Article 24( 1) he should not 
take part in the cases. 79 
Considered that pursuant to 
Article 17(2) he should not 
take part in the cases 
''.Judge Abraham having 
recused ... under Article 
24 of the Statute of the 
Court."80 
''.Judge Abraham ... recused 
himself under Article 24 of 
the Statute of the Court,81 
JudgeOwada Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay In 20061 the judges did not 
(Argentina v. Uruguay) (Apr. participate in the hearing 
20, 2010) "concerning Argentina's 
request for provisional 
measures for serious reasons 
they informed the Court 
of[]". Consequently the 
Judges did not participate in 
the finaljudgement.82 
"President Owada, who 
sat on previous phases of 
the case, informed Vice-
President Tomka that, for 
compelling reasons, he was 
78 Report of the International Court of Justice, i August 2006-31July 2007, at 6 (2007), avail-
able at http://www.icj-cij.org/court/en/reports/report_2006-2007.pdf. 
79 Rosanne, supra note 41 at 1064. 
80 Id. at7. 
81 Id. 
82 I.C.J. Yearbook 2005-20061 at 278 (2006). 
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TAB LE 1.1 Summary of judges' seif-recusal (cont.) 
Judge 
Judge Parra-
Aranguren; 
Judge Buergenthal 
Judge Jiuyong; Judge 
Parra-Aranguren; 
JudgeSimma 
Case 
Application of the Convention 
on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and 
Montenegro) (Feb. 26~ 2007) 
Reason 
unable to attend the oral 
proceedings on the merits 
held between 14 September 
and 2 October 2009. He did 
not participate further in 
the case."83 
Note that Judges Shi and not 
Buergenthal did not sit in 
case for health reasons. 
Judge Parra-Aranguren 
"attended the hearings in 
the case and participated in 
some of the deliberations, 
but not the final stages, 
informed the President of 
the Court that, pursuant 
to Article 24, paragraph 
1, of the Statute, he 
considered he should not 
take part in the decision 
of the case.''84 Moreover, 
Judge Buergenthal, under 
Article 24( 1) of the Statute, 
"informed the President the 
he considered he should not 
take part in the case.85 
Request for Interpretation of the "Two Members of the Court 
Judgment of 31 March 2004 informed the President that 
in the Case concerning Avena they considered that they 
and Other Mexican Nationals should not take part in the 
(Mexico v. United States of case concerning Request 
83 I.C.J. Yearbook 2009-2010, at 309 (2010 ). 
84 I.C.J. Yearbook 2006-2007, at 277 (2007). 
85 I.C.J. Yearbook 2005-2006, at 278 (2006); I.C.J. Yearbook 2006-2007, at 277 (2007). 
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Judge 
Judge Simma;Judge 
Parra-Aranguren 
Case 
America) (Mexico v. United 
States of America) (Jan. 1 9, 
2009) 
Maritime Delimitation in the 
Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine) 
(Feb. 3, 2009) 
23 
Reason 
for Interpretation of the 
Judgment of 31March2004 
in the Case concerning 
Avena and Other Mexican 
Nationals (Mexico v. United 
States of America) (Mexico 
v. United States of America). 
For serious reasons duly 
explained to the Court, 
another Member of the 
Court was unable to take 
part in the hearings on the 
request for the indication 
of provisional measures 
submitted by the Applicant 
in the case. Consequently, 
he did not take part in 
the drafting of the Court's 
decision on that request."86 
"One Member of the Court, 
for reasons duly explained 
to the President, was 
unable to sit in the case .... 
One other Member of the 
Court recused himself from 
participating in the case, 
referring to Article 17, 
paragraph 21 of the 
Statute.''86 
Judge 
Parra-Aranguren 
Application of the International Under Article 23(3) and 
Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Georgia v. 
Russian Federation) 
86 I.C.J. Yearbook 2007-20081 at 328-2 (2008). 
87 J.C.J. Yearbook 2008-20091 at 348 (2009). 
Article 24( 1) of the Statute, 
"[ o ]ne Member of the 
Court, for reasons duly 
explained to the President 
24 
TABLE 1.1 Summary of judges' se!frecusal (cont.) 
Judge 
Judge Simma;Judge 
Tomka 
Judges Shi; 
Judge Buergenthal; 
Judge Koroma 
88 Id. at 348. 
89 Id. at 348-49. 
Case 
(Provisional Measures) 
(Oct. 15, 2008) 
Dispute regarding Navigational 
and Related Rights (Costa Rica 
v. Nicaragua) (July 1 3, 2009) 
Ahmadou Sadia Diallo 
(Republic of Guinea v. 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo) (Nov. 30, 20 1 o) 
go I.C.J. Yearbook 2009-2010, at 309 (2010). 
91 Id. at 309. 
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Reason 
of the Court, was unable to 
sit in the case."88 
"One Member of the Court, 
for reasons explained under 
Article 24, paragraph 1, 
of the Statute, informed 
the President that he 
would not sit in the case 
concerning the Dispute 
regarding Navigational and 
Related Rights (Costa Rica v. 
Nicaragua)."89 
On Monday 19 April 2010, 
at the start of the morning 
hearing on preliminary 
objections in the case, 
President Owada noted 
that, for reasons duly 
communicated to him, 
Judges Shi and Buergenthal, 
who had both sat in 
previous phases of the case, 
were unable to sit in that 
phase of the proceedings. 
They did not participate 
further in the case.90 
Additionally, ''.Judge Koroma 
had informed President 
Owada that he was recusing 
himself from the case.Judge 
Koroma did not participate 
further in the case."91 
THE CHALLENGE AND RECUSAL OF JUDGES 25 
Judge 
Judge Higgins 
Judge Hanqin 
Judge Greenwood 
JudgeSimma 
Case Reason 
Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/ Prior to her election as 
Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks President of the Court, 
and South Ledge (Malaysia/ Dame Higgins, referring to 
Singapore) (May 23, 2008) Article 17, paragraph 2, of 
the Statute, recused herself 
from participating in the 
case.92 
Accordance with international 
law of the unilateral declaration 
of independence in respect of 
Kosovo (Request for Advisory 
Opinion) (July 22, 20 10) 
Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile) 
(Jan. 27, 2014) 
judgment No. 2867ofthe 
Administrative Tribunal of 
the International Labour 
Organization upon a Complaint 
Filed against the International 
Fund for Agricultural 
Development (Request for 
Advisory Opinion) (Feb. 1, 20 1 2) 
Judge Hanqin was council 
for the Republic of China in 
the case.93 
No reason given in 
judgement. 
No reason given in 
judgement. 
As Shabtai Rosenne notes, the prov1s1ons of the Statute regarding self-
recusation "are normally applied as a matters of routine"94 and in fact self-
recusals are quite common. 
As a matter of legal policy, this provision makes sense. Judges are elected 
amongst persons qualified to serve in their country's highest judicial offices 
and from among persons of high moral character. It is justified to have them 
decide, in the first instance, whether a conflict exists that should prevent them 
for sitting in a specific case. Moreover, with fifteen sittingjudges, and a required 
quorum of nine judges, the ICJ's Bench is sufficiently large to accommodate 
92 I.C.J. Yearbook 2010-2011, at 234 n. 5 (2011). 
93 Id at411. 
94 Rosenne, supra note 4, 1062. 
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the potential of one or two judges being unable to sit without impacting the 
final outcome of a thoughtfully decidedjudgment.95 
Importantly, while it is primarily a decision of each judge whether to seek to 
recuse him or herself, further control mechanisms exist to ensure an indepen-
dent bench should a judge be recalcitrant to opt for self-recusal. 
34 The Role of the Court's President 
The President of the Court plays a fundamental role in ensuring that the 
independence of the Court is maintained. Thus, Article 24 provides that "if 
the President considers that for some special reasons one of the Members of 
the Court should not sit in a particular case, he shall give him [or her] notice 
accordingly."96 
This power has been used rarely; indeed only one instance is known. In the 
South West Africa case (Ethiopia & Liberia v. South Africa), the President, Sir 
Percy Spender, announced in the opening of the substantive hearings that Sir 
Mohammed Zafrullah Khan would not participate in the case. Though there is 
no public record, it appeared from subsequent declarations by Judge Khan that 
the President himself had asked Judge Khan not to participate in the case, as 
he had at one point been nominated as an ad hoc judge by one of the parties, 
though he had not acted in that capacity.97 
Article 34 of the Rules of the Court further provides that in case of any doubt 
arising as to the application of Article i7(2) of the Statute or in case of a dis-
agreement as to the application of Article 24 of the Statute, the President shall 
inform the Members of the Court, who retain the final power of decision.98 
3.5 The Role of the Court 
The ultimate arbiter for all issues related to the composition of the Court 
remains the Court itself. Under Article 241 for example, it is for the Court to 
settle by decision on any disagreement between a member of the Court and 
the President on whether a special reason exists as a consequence of which a 
member should not sit in particular case.99 
95 !CJ Statute, Art. 25.3 ("A quorum of nine judges shall suffice to constitute the Court"). 
96 !CJ Statute Art. 24. 
97 Sir Robert Jennings & Philippe Couvreur, Article 24, in The Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, A Commentary 461-62 (Andreas Zimmerman et al. eds., 2nd ed., 2006); 
see also Rosanne, supra note 4, at 1058. 
98 ICJ Rules Art. 34. 
99 ICJ Statute Art. 24. 
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The Court is also involved in all final decisions related to relative or func-
tional incompatibility of a judge to hold office. Thus, under Article 16(2) of the 
Statute, the Court decides on any doubt related to the exercise of political or 
administrative functions or engagement in other professional occupation by 
the any of its Members.100 Similarly, the Court is also the ultimate decision 
maker on any doubt related to a Member's acting as agent, counsel or advocate 
or past activities as agent, counsel, or advocate for one of the parties, or as a 
member of a national or international court; or of a commission of enquiry, or 
in any other capacity.IOI Article 34(1) of the Rules also provides that it is for the 
Court as a whole to decide any doubt about the application of Article 17(2) of 
the Statute.102 
3.6 Third Party Disqualification Requests 
Disqualification proceedings can also be initiated by one of the parties. Under 
Article 34(2) of the Rules, a party can communicate confidentially to the 
President in writing "any facts which it considers to be of possible relevance" 
to the application of Article 17 and Article 24 of the Statute, and which the par-
ties believe may not be knowri to the Court.I03 
4 Grounds for Disqualification 
Grounds for disqualifications of judges at the ICJ are not specified separately 
in the Statute. Rosenne points out that there "seem to be no standing grounds 
for recusation beyond the provisions of Articles 16 and 17 of the Statute .... "I04 
These grounds, analyzed in details above, provide certain limited cases of rela-
tive and absolute (or functional) incompatibility.105 
100 Id. Art.16(2). 
101 Id. Art. 17. 
102 ICJ Rules Art. 34. 
103 Article 34 of the Rules provides that "i. In case of any doubt arising as to the application 
of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Statute or in case of a disagreement as to the application 
of Article 24 of the Statute, the President shall inform the Members of the Court, with 
whom the decision lies. a. If a party desires to bring to the attention of the Court facts 
which it considers to be of possible relevance to the application of the provisions of the 
Statute mentioned in the previous paragraph, but which it believes may not be known 
to the Court, that party shall communicate confidentially such facts to the President in 
writing." Id. 
104 Rosenne, supra note 4, at 1062. 
105 See supra Section 2.2 and Section 2.3. 
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Thus, under these provisions, there are three grounds for recusal that derive 
from the ICJ Statute: 
(1) judge exercising political or administrative function. The restriction is 
derived from Article 16. 
( 2) Acting as agent, counsel, or advocate in any case. The prohibition is derived 
from Article 17(1) and applies only to elected members. 
(3) Past participation in a case as agent, counsel, or advocate for one of the par-
ties, or as a member of a national or international court, or of a commission 
of enquiry, or in arry other capacity. This provision derives from Article 
17(2), which applies to both elected and, by operation of Article 31(6), ad 
hoc judges. 
4.1 Instances of Attempted Disqualification of judges 
A party's attempts to disqualify judges of the ICJ are rare. Since its inception, 
the Court only dealt with three formal attempts to have the Court find mem-
bers of the Court ineligible in a particular case in three different cases.106 All 
three cases relate to alleged prejudgment of the case and relate to past diplo-
matic actions at the United Nations. In one case, one party also alleged that 
certain declarations made by one of the judges allegedly demonstrated pos-
sible bias. All three challenges were unsuccessful. Only in one case the motiva-
tions for rejecting the challenge are public. Interestingly, two of the three cases 
refer to instance of alleged bias in advisory opinions, which are not binding, 
and only one was brought during contentious proceedings. 
4.1.1 South West Africa Case (Ethiopia v. South Africa & Liberia v. South 
Africa) 
In the second phase of the South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia & Liberia v. South 
Africa), South Africa notified the Court "of its intention to make an applica-
tion to the Court relating to the composition of the Court relating to the com-
position of the Court."107 The Court rejected the application after hearing the 
contentions in closed hearing. Both the members and the judge ad hoc took 
part in that decision.108 The details of the recusal application by South Africa 
have never been revealed. However it was known to refer to Judge Luis Padilla 
Nervo (Mexico), who had been President to the 1951 session of the General 
106 Rosenne, supra note 4, at 1059. 
107 South West Africa Cases (Ethi & Liber. v. S. Afr.), Order Relating to Composition of the 
Court, 4 (Mar.18, 1965), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/47/2718.pd£ 
108 Id. at5. 
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Assembly and had been a member of the Mexican delegation to the General 
Assembly from 1947 to 1963.109 South Africa filed an application to the Court 
Relating to the Composition of the Court on March 14, 1965. The Court noti-
fied the Agents for the Applicants and heard the contentions of the Parties 
with regard to the application in closed hearings on March 15 and 16, 1965.110 It 
rejected the challenge by eight votes to six by formal order made under Article 
48 of the Statute.111 Judge Padilla Nervo did not participate in the vote of the 
order, but then participated in the Judgment. Interestingly, the judges ad hoc 
also participated in that vote.112 
4.1.2 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South 
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security 
Council Resolution 276 (1970) 
In the related advisory opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the 
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwith-
standing Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) [Namibia Advisory Opinion], 
South Africa attempted to disqualify three members of the Court.113 The gov-
ernment of South Africa filed written statements on November 19, 1970 where 
it objected to the participation of certain members of the Court in the proceed-
ings. The Court issued three separate orders on January 26, 1971. The Orders 
were made under Article 48 of the Statute and were unreasoned. 
Order No. 1: In relation to President Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan-the 
court unanimously decided not to accede to the objection that had been 
raised. The vote was taken by all twelve non-challenged Judges. President 
Khan, Judge Padilla Nervo, Judge Morozov did not participate.114 
Order No. 2: With regard to Judge Padilla Nervo. The Court unani-
mously decided not to accede to the objection that had been raised. 
Judges Padilla Nervo and Morozov did not participate in the vote.115 
109 Rosenne, supra note 4, at 1059. 
110 Id. 
i11 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) [Namibia Advisory 
Opinion], Order No.1, i971 I.C.J. 3 (Jan. 26). 
115 Namibia Advisory Opinion, Order No. 2, 1971 I.C.J. 6 (Jan. 26). 
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Order No. 3: With regard to Judge Morozov. The Court by ten votes to 
four decided not to accede to the objection that had been raised. Judge 
Morozov did not participate in the vote.116 
On the same date, the Court also issued Order No. 4 denying South Africa's 
request to appoint aJudge adhoc.117 In its advisory opinion the Court explained 
that the objections were made under Article 17(2) of the Statute.118 In the opin-
ion, the Court also explained that South Africa's objections were based "on 
statements made or other participation by the Members concerned, in their 
former capacity as representatives of their Governments, in United Nations 
organs which were dealing with matters concerning South Africa."119 The Court 
gave careful consideration to South Africa's objection but found no reason, for 
Order no. 2, to depart from the decision it had taken in its order of March 18, 
1965 in the South West Africa cases.120 In deciding the other two cases, the 
Court found that the Members' activities in the UN organs prior to their elec-
tion to the Court did not "furnish grounds for treating these objections differ-
ently" from those raised in its 1965 decision.121 The Court also specified that, 
as for Oder no. 3, the participation of the Member, prior to his election to 
the Court, in the formulation of a Security Council resolution that took into 
consideration in its preamble GA Res. 2145 (xx1) did not justify a different 
conclusion.122 In explaining its decision on the challenges, the Court also spe-
cifically refers to the precedents established by the PCIJ "wherein judges sat in 
certain cases even though they had taken part in the formulation of texts the 
Court was asked to interpret."123 
4.1.3 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory 
The challenge brought against Judge Nabil Elaraby (Egypt) by Israel in the 
Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory [Wall Opinion] is the most recent case of a party 
requesting the recusal of a judge because of his past professional experience. 
116 Namibia Advisory Opinion, Order No. 3, 19711.c.J. 9 (Jan. 26). 
117 Namibia Advisory Opinion, Order, 1971 I.C.J. 12, 13 (Jan. 29). 
118 Namibia Advisory Opinion, Advisory Opinion, 1971I.C.J.16, if 9 (June 21). 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Rosanne, supra note 4, at 1060. 
122 GA Res. 2145(xx1) of 27October1966 (Question of South-West Africa). 
123 Id. 
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It is also the first time that a party also uses public declarations by a judge as a 
ground for recusal. 
In the Wall Opinion, Israel sent a confidential letter to the ICJ President to 
bring to his attention certain facts it considered possibly relevant to the partici-
pation of judge Elaraby in the case.124 Israel raised three issues. First, it claimed 
that judge Elaraby should be recused because of his active, official and public 
role as an Egyptian diplomat. The Court rejected this claim and noted the expe-
rience of judge Elaraby in the 1970s and 1980s as a legal adviser to the Egyptian 
Government, including his work at the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and his involvement in the Camp David Middle East Peace Conference of 1978 
and the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty in 1979 "were performed in his capacity of a 
diplomatic representative of his country" and occurred "many years before the 
question of the construction of the wall in the occupied Palestinian territory, 
now submitted for advisory opinion, arose:•125 Second, Israel also claimed that 
judge Elaraby had been involved in decisions at the General Assembly that 
were relevant for the case. The ICJ again dismissed the claim and concluded 
the question for the Court "was not an issue in the Tenth Emergency Special 
Session of the General Assembly until after judge Elaraby had ceased to partic-
ipate in that Session as representative of Egypt.''126 Finally, Israel complained 
that in an interview prior to his election to the Court, judge Elaraby had made 
statements that could infer a prejudgment of some of the issues in the case.127 
The Court again dismissed the claim and concluded that judge Elaraby's 
124 Legal Consequence of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Order of the Composition of the Court [Wall Opinion], 2004 J.C.J. 3 (Jan. 30). 
125 Id. if 8 ("Whereas however the activities of Judge Elaraby referred to in the letter of 
is January 2004 from the Government of Israel were performed in his capacity of a diplo-
matic representative of his country, most of them many years before the question of the 
construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territory, now submitted for advisory 
opinion, arose; whereas that question was not an issue in the Tenth Emergency Special 
Session of the General Assembly until after Judge Elaraby had ceased to participate in 
that Session as representative of Egypt; whereas in the newspaper interview of August 
2001,Judge Elaraby expressed no opinion on the question put in the present case; whereas 
consequently Judge Elaraby could not be regarded as having 'previously taken part' in the 
case in any capacity."). 
126 Id. 
127 Joseph R. Brubaker, The judge Who Knew Too Much: Issue Conflicts in International 
Adjudication, 26 Berkeley J. Int'! L. m, 119 (2008) (citing Wall Opinion, 2004 l.C.J. 3, if 8 
(Jan. 30) (dissenting opinion of Judge Buergenthal)) ("that 'Israel is occupying Palestinian 
territory, and the occupation itself is against international law' and that Israel's territorial 
claims were fabricated to create 'confusion and gain[] time'."). 
/ 
32 GIORGETTI 
. . h t" t . th t "128 comments "expressed no op1mon on t e ques ion pu m e presen case. 
The Court hence concluded that Judge Elaraby had not previously taken part 
in the case, as required by Article 17(2) of the Statute for a finding of relative 
incompatibility. Israel's request was rejected thirteen to one (as it is customary, 
Judge Elaraby did not participate in the vote). Interestingly, Judge Buergenthal 
dissented on the last point and asserted that although this "formalistic and 
narrow" construction of Article 17(2) had not been violated, he was concerned 
that the interview created "an appearance of bias" that required the Court to 
preclude Judge Elaraby's participation in the proceedings.129 
In sum, this limited practice shows that the Court has found that prior diplo-
matic activities as government representatives or at the United Nations would 
not generally be considered tantamount to a prior participation in the case 
and would therefore not create a reason to disqualify a judge under the appli-
cable rules. Judge Buergenthal's dissent raises the important point of whether 
this application of the standard is too formalistic, and whether an "appear-
ance of bias" standard, in line with other arbitral rules, is preferable. This is 
an important discussion to be had, especially because, on one side, judges are 
often selected among those who have significant experience as diplomats or 
as international law counsel, and, on the other side, the growing use of inter-
national dispute resolution mechanisms can result in increased instances of 
conflicts. 
5 Conclusion 
Requests for recusal and disqualification of judges of the 1 CJ are rare and none 
so far has been successful. The control mechanisms of the composition of 
the ICJ's Bench rely mostly on the individual decision not to participate in a 
case by each judge (self-recusal). This system has been largely successful, and 
several judges have over the years decided not to participate in certain cases 
because of their previous professional experiences. The President of the ICJ 
has used his power to request a judge not to participate in a case only once.130 
When a request for disqualification was filed by a party, the Court has adopted 
a strict reading of the applicable rules, and generally refused to consider 
that prior diplomatic functions at the UN or in one's Capital may create an 
128 Wall Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 3, if 8. 
129 Id. if 14. 
130 Though it is difficult to know if some instances of self-recusals may have resulted from an 
informal discussion with the President. 
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incompatibility. With the increase use of binding dispute resolutions mecha-
nisms, the higher scrutiny of judges' behavior, and the fact that many judges 
acted as counsel, arbitrators or diplomats in a variety of cases or continue to 
act as arbitrators in international disputes, the discussion over the standard to 
apply to assess a party's recusal requests will be an important one. 
